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INTRODUCTION 
Mathematical ability, like spatial and verbal 
abilities, is an area in which fairly consistent sex 
differences have been found. Males out-perform females 
at tasks measuring mathematial and spatial abilities, 
while females out-perform males at tasks measuring 
verbal abilities (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974). 
Yet, it is not clear whether these differences are 
innate, or learned, or a combination of both. The 
purpose of this paper is to further explore one area of 
learned differences between the sexes, Attribution 
Theory of Achievement Motivation, that may explain the 
small yet significant difference (Fennema & Sherman, 
1977; Hyde, 1981; Ridley & Novak, 1983) between males' 
and females' performance in one cognitive ability 
category, mathematics. 
Quite a volume of research has looked for a 
biological basis for sex differences in cognitive 
abilities. Researchers have probed brain lateralization 
(Levy, 1981; Sherman, 1977), an X chromosome linked gene 
(Stafford, 1972) and hormonal differences (Money & 
Ehrhardt, 1972) in hopes of identifying biologically 
based causes for the observed gender differences (see 
Frieze, Parsons, Johnson, Ruble, & Zellman, 1978 for 
review). However, recent reviews of the literature on 
1 
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sex differences in mathematical ability have ruled out 
an innate ability difference as the primary causal 
determinant of the discrepancy in male and female 
performance at mathematical tasks (Fennema, 1977; Fox, 
1977; Sherman, 1977). As Williams (1983) concludes, 
"evidence for biological contributions to males' 
superior performance in mathematics is weaker than it is 
for spatial ability and accumulating evidence is more 
supportive of socialization factors " (p. 135). 
Therefore, further investigation of learning experiences 
and socialization influences that are hypothesized to 
contribute to differences in mathematical ability is 
undertaken here. 
One such promising area of investigation is the 
application of Attribution Theory of Achievement 
Motivation (ATAM) (Weiner, 1972a; Weiner, 1972b; Weiner, 
1974; Weiner, 1985; Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, & 
Rosenbaum, 1971) to the study of sex differences in 
mathematical ability. It is the purpose of this study to 
examine sex differences in causal attributions for a 
mathematics task. No attempt is made to empirically 
validate a general theory which would apply to any task. 
The latter is probably not possible (e.g., McHugh, 
Fisher, & Frieze, 1982, for one example of 
generalizability limitations), while the former may help 
explain male and female differences in level of 
achievement for mathematically-related carrers like 
accounting, computer science, and engineering which 
typically of fer higher status and higher pay than 
traditionally female dominated career areas (Fennema, 
1977 cited in Pedro, Wolleat, Fennema, & Becker, 1981; 
Frieze, Parsons, Johnson, Ruble, & Zellman, 1978; 
Parsons, Meece, & Adler, 1982). 
3 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Causal attributions for one's success or failure 
is one of the three major areas cognitively oriented 
research has focused on to understand sex differences in 
achievement behavior (Frieze, Fisher, Hanusa, McHugh, & 
Valle, 1978; Frieze, Parsons, Johnson, Ruble, & Zellman; 
1978). The other two major foci of research in this 
area are the study of differential motives or values and 
that men and women differentially define success. 
Generally, degree and direction of attributions for 
personal success or failure, as well as attributions 
made by an observer to an actor, are expected to differ 
depending on the sex of the person to whom the 
attributions apply (the self or the actor). Also, sex 
differences in attributional patterns are expected to be 
even more pronounced if the task is sex-typed, as is 
mathematics (Wolleat, Pedro, Becker, & Fennema, 1980). 
Attribution Theory 
Attribution Theory of Achievement Motivation 
springs from several more global theories of social 
behavior: Heider's Theory of Phenomenal Causality 
(1958), Kelley's Theory of External Attribution (1967), 
Atkinson's Expectancy Value Theory of Achievement 
Motivation (1964), Rotter's Reformulation of the Locus 
4 
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of Control Theory (1966), and Rosenbaum's Intentionality 
concept (1972; cited in Weiner, 1979). 
Attribution Theory is based on cognitive-behavior 
theory, and thus has the "framework of an S-C-R model; 
where C symbolizes causal cognition and S and R 
represent stimulus-response or antecedent-consequent 
relationships" (Weiner, 1976, p. 180). A person's 
attention to, thought about, and interpretation of 
events is guided by assigning causes to these events 
(Kelley, 1967; Shaw & Costanzo, 1982). Attributions are 
cognitions which attempt to make sense out of events in 
the context of the internal and external environment. 
Attribution Theory's cognitive mediational 
grounding thereby postulates individual variation in the 
causal interpretation of any given event. Individual's 
ascriptions to causality are the focus of Attribution 
Theory, and therefore, the theory addresses an 
individual's perception of causality. Yet, individual's 
perceptions of causality are subject to distortions and 
errors (Kelley, 1967). According to Kelley (1967) there 
are five potential sources of attributional errors: 
ignoring a relevant situation; making egocentric 
assumptions; one's emotions and self-esteem being 
affected by relevant events; interpreting misleading 
cues form the surrounding situation; and one's responses 
6 
being affected by hidden causal factors. Specific 
hypotheses concerning differential attributional errors 
made by males and females from Weiner's perspective will 
be a major focus of the present paper. 
Attribution Theory focuses on 111 why 1 questions, 
or the relationship between phenomena (effects) and the 
reasons (responsible agents) for those events" (Weiner, 
1972, p. 310) including the self. The answers to the 
"why" questions are referred to as perceptions of 
causality which Weiner (1972) defines as "the judgement 
of why a particular response occurred" (p. 203). A 
central assumption of Weiner's ATAM states that 
comprehension of causality, a basic search for 
understanding, is one of the primary sources of 
motivation and behavior (Weiner, 1979). 
Perceptions of causality are of central importance 
according to attribution theorists. Attribution 
theorists propose perceptions of causality have a wide 
ranging effect on behaviors, affects and cognitions. 
ATAM proposes that an individual's search for 
understanding often leads to attributional questioning, 
a search of environmental cues and personal 
characteristics to explain an outcome to the questioner 
(Weiner, 1979). It is important to note that Attribution 
Theory applies to both interpreting prior events (post-
7 
dieting) and predicting future events (Weiner, 1985). 
Attribution Theory of Achievement Motivation 
Attribution Theory of Achievement Motivation 
(ATAM) consists of three dimensions of attributional 
causality which serve as higher order conceptualizations 
by which to organize the specific causes used in the 
attributional questioning and ascription process. The 
three dimensions of causality include: the locus of 
causality (internality and externality), which is 
theoretically based on work by Heider (1958) and Rotter 
(1966); the stability dimension (stable versus unstable 
causes), based again on Reider's work (1958); and the 
dimension of controllability (controllable versus 
uncontrollable causes) based on Heider (1958) and 
Rosenbaum's concept of intentionality (1972, cited in 
Weiner, 1979). These dimensions are presented in Table 
1 . 
The theoretical foundations of the locus of 
causality dimension are grounded, in part, in Rotter's 
concept of locus of control. Yet, an important 
distinction must be made between locus of control 
according to Rotter and the locus of causality in the 
Attribution Theory framework. Attribution theorists 
(Ickes & Layden, 1978) argue that Rotter does not make 
8 
Table 1 
~ribution Theory of Achievement Motivation: Causal 
Dimensions and Causal Categories 
Internal External 
Stable Unstable Stable Unstable 
Uncontrol-
lable Ability Mood Task Luck 
Controllable Typical Immediate Teacher Unusual 
Effort Effort Bias Help from 
Others 
9 
the necessary distinction between "control" and 
"causality" but uses both concepts interchangably. 
Rotter's locus of control collapses the causality and 
controllability dimension into a single dimension. The 
dinstinction between the two concepts can be illustrated 
by considering "control" versus "cause" of a negative 
event. Control addresses the question of whether the 
person has the power to change the negative event: Is 
it within his or her power to control the event? On the 
other hand, "causality" addresses the issue of whether 
the subject caused the event or not: Was the cause of 
the event internal or external? Some events may be 
causally attributed to either one or both controllable 
and internal causes. 
Weiner proposes that causes along each dimension 
of causality serve a particular purpose. Locus of 
causality is related to self-esteem related affects. 
Ascriptions along the stability dimension corresponds to 
degree of expectancy change for future success. And the 
controllability dimension relates to the perceiver's 
attributional evaluation of others (Weiner, 1985). 
For the purposes of the present study, only the 
two dimensions which were offered in the original 
presentation of ATAM (Weiner et al., 1971) will be 
utilized. Judgments of causality along these two 
10 
dimensions, locus of causality and stability, 
differentially affect intrapersonal evaluation (Weiner, 
1985). The present study shall focus on an individual's 
causal attributions to himself or herself, or 
intrapersonal evaluation, thereby focusing on 
attributions regarding self-perception which are 
addressed by the locus of causality and stability 
dimensions. Although the importance of also examining a 
person's attributions to others has been documented 
(Frieze, Fisher, Hanusa, & Valle, 1978). 
The third dimension, controllability, mediates 
attributional evaluation of others, which is not 
addressed here. Although many additional causal 
categories have been suggested (Weiner, 1979) and 
generated by research (Frieze, 1976), general consensus 
(Bar-Tal, 1978; Weiner, 1976; Weiner et al., 1971) and 
empirical evidence (Freize, 1976) support the use of the 
locus of causality and stability dimensions as those 
which generate the most explanatory power. It is 
important to utilize these dimensions as Valle and 
Frieze (1976) found that both the locus of causality 
dimension and the stability dimension affect future 
estimates of global success or failure and the degree 
rating of success or failure. A 2x2 summary table of 
11 
Weiner's original causal categories is presented 
(Table 2). 
According to Weiner, individuals may use one or 
many causal categories to evaluate a given outcome 
event. In the original presentation of ATAM (Weiner et 
al., 1971) as reworded by Weiner (1979) the authors 
postulated that in achievement-related contexts the 
causes perceived as most responsible for success and 
failure are ability, effort, task difficulty, and 
luck. That is, in attempting to explain prior 
success or failure for an achievement-related event, 
the individual assesses his or her ability, the 
amount of effort that was expended, the difficulty 
of the task, and the magnitude and direction of the 
experienced luck. (The authors) ... assumed that 
rather general values are assigned to these factors 
and that the task outcome is differentially ascribed 
to the causal sources. (Weiner, 1979, p. 4) 
The four causal categories mentioned above, which 
will be assessed in the present study, may be classified 
according to the pair of dimensional attributes which 
characterize each: ability is an internal, stable 
cause; effort is an internal, unstable cause; task is an 
external, stable cause; and luck is an external, 
unstable cause (see Table 2). 
The number of causal categories used to explain a 
given outcome is dependent on the expectancy (Atkinson, 
1964) of that outcome. "In sum, when performance 
outcomes are uncommon (unexpected), attributions tend to 
include multiple causes; when performance outcomes are 
12 
Table 2 
Attribution Theory of Achievement Motivation: 
original Causal Dimensions and Causal Categories 
~-L_o_cus of Causality 
Stability Internal External 
Stable Ability Task 
Unstable Effort Luck/Environment 
13 
common (expected), attributions are made to only one 
cause" (Weiner, 1985, p. 342; parentheses added). For 
example, when a person expects to fail at a given task, 
Atkinson proposes that the person will tend to use 
several causes such as ability, effort and luck to 
explain the outcome. When a person anticipates success, 
Atkinson theorizes that the person will attribute the 
outcome to one causes such as ability. 
Not only does the number of causes used vary, the 
frequency with which a cause is used also varies. 
Individuals, according to Weiner (1985), are predisposed 
to use certain attributional categories more heavily 
than others. There is a degree of flexibility within 
the attribution framework to understand individual 
differences in the use of causal attributions. 
Investigations in this area have grouped individuals, 
particularly by sex, to study the differential use of 
causal attributions, reasons for differential use, and 
consequences of differential use for each group. 
Investigations of this sort will be discussed in greater 
detail below. 
In addition to using multiple causal categories, 
individuals use multiple cues to reach causal inferences 
(Weiner, 1972; Weiner, 1985; Weiner et al., 1971). The 
antecedents, or cues, used to infer attributions of 
14 
causality include number and percent of prior successes 
and failures, pattern of performance, primacy and 
recentness effects, social norms, maximum level of 
performance, time spent at the task, and covariation of 
the outcomes with performance incentives. 
More specifically, ability attributions are made 
dependent on the "degree of the past success at that and 
similar tasks" (Weiner et al., 1971, p. 5) Thus, the 
consistency and generality of performance are important 
cues regarding ability attributions. Comparisons to 
others or groups of others and the maximum performance 
level achieved, which indicates peak capabilities, are 
also important cues regarding ability attributions. 
Effort attributions are dependent on cues such as· 
muscular tension, task persistence, and pattern of 
performance (increased attribution to effort when 
performance improves over time). But effort is most 
often a post-hoc attribution made after the outcome is 
known (Weiner, 1985; Weiner et al., 1971). Attributions 
to task difficulty are "inferred from social norms 
indicating the performance of others at the task'' 
(Weiner et al., 1971, p. 5). If many succeed, the task 
is thought to be easy. If many fail, it is assumed to be 
difficult. More minor cues for attributions to task 
difficulty are characteristics of the task, such as 
15 
length complexity and novelty (Weiner, 1985). Finally, 
attributions to luck are "inferred from the pattern of 
prior reinforcements: the more random or variable in 
pattern of outcomes, the higher the probability that 
luck will be perceived as a causal influence" (Weiner et 
al., 1971, p. 5). Other cues used to make luck 
attributions include the type of task and prior unique 
events salient to the person (Weiner, 1985). 
Causality and Affective Reactions 
Early writings on ATAM hypothesized the importance 
of the dimensions of locus of causality and stability in 
understanding the consequences of making a particular 
causal attribution. Specifically, it was hypothesized 
that attributions along the locus of causality dimension 
influence affective reactions of the person to goal 
attainment, and the attributions made along the 
stability dimension influence the person's expectancy 
for future change (Weiner, 1974). Correlates of the 
stability dimension will be addressed shortly. 
Weiner's hypothesis concerning affective reactions 
to goal attainment corresponding to causal categories is 
grounded in Atkinson's proposed general dispositions: to 
seek success for the purpose of generating pride, and to 
avoid failure so one avoids shame that would be 
generated by failing (Atkinson, 1964). Atkinson also 
16 
hypothesized that one takes greater pride in the 
accomplishment of a difficult task than an easy one, and 
one experiences greater shame at failing at an easy task 
than at a difficult one (Atkinson, 1964). Shame and 
pride were considered the dominant affects in 
achievement-related situations (Atkinson, 1964; 
McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953). 
Therefore, Weiner's and Atkinson's original 
hypotheses proposed affective reactions to goal 
attainment were dependent on whether the attributional 
cause used was an internal or an external one. Emotional 
reactions were assumed to be strongest given internal or 
self-esteem related attributions and weakest given 
external reactions (Weiner, 1979; Weiner, Russell, & 
Lerman, 1978). But, empirically the proposed degree of 
strength or weakness of reaction along the internal-
external dimension and the pride-shame emotional 
dichotomy is unsupported (Weiner, 1977). Instead, a 
variety of emotions can result from causal attributions 
and these emotions result from ascriptions to each of 
the four causal categories (Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 
1978). Therefore, the locus of causality is not 
considered a moderator variable for affective reactions, 
but instead emotions relate more directly to each causal 
17 
category in a unique way (Weiner, 1979; Weiner, Russell, 
& Lerman, 1978). 
Research in this area asked subjects to generate a 
free-response list of potential affective responses to 
success and failure events (Frieze, 1976). Subsequently, 
subjects were asked to report the affective intensity of 
each response that would be experienced in a given 
success or failure situation (Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 
1978). The findings, which have been integrated into 
more recent writings on ATAM (Weiner, 1985), are 
threefold. 
First, outcome of the task mediates an overall 
positive or negative emotional reaction. Success results 
in positive or "good" feelings, while failure results in 
negative or "bad" feelings. 
Secondly, distinct emotions are most frequently 
paired with each causal category. For instance, a 
success attribution to ability elicits foremost a 
feeling of worth; whereas a success attribution to luck 
results mostly in surprise. (See Weiner, 1985 for a 
complete list.) 
Finally, the causality dimension does play a role 
in mediating self-ascriptions or self-esteem related 
affects (internal versus external attributions), and 
thereby attaches a "pride" or "shame" emotional 
18 
component to the emotional reactions described above. 
Empirical evidence generated by others has 
supported Weiner's more recent proposition and has found 
that success, especially on difficult tasks, leads to 
positive affective responses; and failures, especially 
on easy tasks, leads to negative affective response 
(Ruble, Parsons, & Ross, 1976). Therefore, Atkinson's 
(1964) hypothesis concerning the amount of affective 
reaction to a success versus a failure at a difficult or 
easy task is partially supported. However, instead of 
considering pride and shame as the dominant emotions 
experienced, a more careful consideration of each causal 
category as well as the outcome is necessary to 
determine the type of affect(s) most likely to be 
expericed. 
CausalitY._1!.nd Ex2ectancies 
Weiner hypothesized that the dimension of 
stability plays a crucial role in determining a person's 
expectancy for success or failure. The cognitive 
reactions to a task, in the form of post-dictive 
attributions for an outcome, relate to the 
direction and the magnitude of expectancy change 
(Weiner, 1974; Weiner, 1976) to the degree to which the 
outcome is attributed to a stable cause versus an 
unstable cause. Theorists have argued (Phares, 1957.; 
19 
Weiner, 1972; Weiner, 1976) that as the degree of 
attribution to a.stable factor increases after success, 
the expectancy of future success increases. For 
example, as a person increases his or her attribution to 
ability or task difficulty following a successful 
outcome, his or her future expectancy for success will 
increase. Likewise, as the degree of attribution to an 
unstable factor after failure increases, the expectancy 
for future success also increases because this pattern 
leaves one's positive self-perception of ability intact 
(Merton, 1946). The person is able to disregard the 
failure outcome as a fluke event, and continue to 
anticipate the chance for a future success. 
Therefore, a subject's expectancy for future 
change is strongest when one attributes an outcome to an 
unstable cause such as effort or luck. Effort and luck 
operate uncertainly at any point in time, so that for 
future events one may more easily exert more effort or 
one's luck may improve. It is less likely that one would 
be able to change ability at a task or make a given task 
easier. Since ability and the task difficulty are less 
likely to change over time, one has lower expectancies 
for change in these stable areas (Bar-Tal, 1978). These 
hypotheses have been verified by numerous empirical 
studies (McMahan, 1973; Ostrove, 1978; Rest, Nierenberg, 
20 
Weiner, & Heckhausen, 1973; Weiner, Heckhausen, Meyer, & 
Cook, 1972; Weiner & Kukla, 1970; Weiner, Nierenberg, & 
Goldstein, 1976). 
Causal attributions are viewed as partially 
determining an individual's affective experience, 
cognitive representations of future expectancies and 
behavioral reactions to a success or failure experience 
on an achievement-related task (Weiner et al, 1971). 
Attributions are expected to systematically relate to 
several major areas of one's functioning including 
affective reactions and cognitive reactions such as 
expectancies for future performance. Also related are 
behavioral consequences such as performance intensity, 
which is dependent on attributions along the stability 
dimension, and task persistence, which relates to 
attributions along the causality dimension (Dweck, 
Davidson, Nielson, & Enna, 1978). Weiner (1985) presents 
the above relationship as a type of a chain reaction in 
which attributions affect expectancies and emotions, 
which in turn, affect choice of, intensity of, and 
persistence of behavior. 
Empirical evidence supports these hypotheses 
(Feather, 1969; Feather & Simon, 1971; Rest, 1976; 
Weiner et al., 1978; Lawrence & Festinger, 1962) and 
suggests attributions are related to actual subsequent 
21 
achievement levels for laboratory and field tasks 
(Dweck, Davidson, Nelson, & Enna, 1978; Dweck & Repucci, 
1973; Weiner, Heckhausen, Meyer, & Cook, 1972), and to 
continued course taking in mathematics (Pedro, Wolleat, 
Fennema, & Becker, 1981). 
Research in the area of causal attributions to 
success or failure has found the effect of the task 
outcome on causal attributions to be a salient factor, 
thus confirming the post-dictive as well as pre-dictive 
nature of attributions (Weiner, 1985). Students who 
succeed at a task generally attribute causality for this 
outcome largely to internal cues such as ability and 
effort, while students who fail attribute causality 
largely to external cues such as luck and task 
difficulty (Arkin & Maruyama, 1979; Sweeney, Moreland, & 
Gruber, 1982). This issue shall be addressed in the 
present paper. 
Attribution Theory of Achievement Motivation has 
been applied to a wide variety of achievement areas and 
cognitive abilities including mathematical ability 
(Eccles, Adler, Futterman, Goff, Kaczala, Meece, & 
Midgley, 1983; Eccles, Adler, & Meece, 1984; Leder, 
1982, cited in Leder, 1984; Parsons, Meece, Adler, & 
Kaczala, 1982; Pedro, Wolleat, Fennema, & Becker, 1981; 
Wolleat, Pedro, Becker, & Fennema, 1980). ATAM has also 
been applied to other aspects of behavior such as 
depression, loneliness and affiliation, hyperactivity, 
mastery and parole decisions (Weiner, 1979). 
ATAM is particularly applicable to the issue of 
sex differences (and racial differences; see Katz, 1967 
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for discussion) in specific cognitive abilities. ATAM 
provides an example of "how characteristics other than 
cognitive skills may affect an individual's performance 
on achievement tasks" (Bar-Tal, 1978; p. 266). "Females 
and individuals with certain causal perceptions may 
perform below their abilities because of their 
maladaptive patterns of attributions" (Bar-Tal, 1978, p. 
267). The maladaptive patterns of attributions 
potentially adversely affect expectancies, emotional 
experiences, and behaviors which all appear to correlate 
with success experiences. 
Perhaps investigating attributional patterns will 
be useful in further exploring the ways in which women 
and men differentially ascribe causality for success and 
failure experiences in the area of mathematics. By 
narrowing the focus of the present study to a specific 
task, mathematics in a noncompetitive setting, 
generalizability of the findings to other tasks will be 
limited. But these limitations are necessary because 
factors such as sex-role appropriations of the task 
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(McHugh, Fisher, & Frieze, 1982), the competitiveness of 
the setting (Teglasi, 1977), and the type of task 
(Levine & Uleman, 1979) have been shown to relate to sex 
differences in attributional patterns. 
ATAM and Sex Differences 
Causal attributions for one's success or failure 
is one of the three major areas cognitively oriented 
research has focused on to understand sex differences in 
achievement behavior (Frieze, Fisher, Hanusa, McHugh, & 
Valle, 1978; Frieze, Parsons, Johnson, Ruble, & Zellman, 
1978). The other major areas of research include the 
study of differential motives and values and 
differential definitions of success between males and 
females. Generally, degree and direction of 
attributions for personal success or failure, as well as 
attributions made by an observer to an actor, are 
expected to differ depending on the sex of the person to 
whom the attributions apply (the self or the actor). 
Also, sex differences in attributional patterns are 
expected to be even more pronounced if the task is sex-
typed, as is mathematics (Wolleat, Pedro, Becker, & 
Fennema, 1980). 
However, because the authors of ATAM have not 
articulated specific predictions concerning sex 
differences in causal attributions for achievement-
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oriented tasks, the result has been two-fold. First, 
researchers have generated several models based on 
Weiner et al. 's (1971) original conceptualization while 
also drawing on other more general theories of behavior 
and sex differences. These models, in turn, have 
specified more exact hypotheses concerning sex 
differences in achievement behavior including actual 
acievement, course taking behavior, and expectancies for 
future performance (Dweck et al., 1978; Dweck, & 
Repucci, 1973; Fontaine, 1974; McMahan, 1973; Ostrove, 
1978; Valle & Frieze, 1976; Weiner, 1972a; Weiner, 
Niernberg, & Goldstein, 1976). 
Yet, researchers in this area have not compared 
the predictive power of the models, nor have they 
consistently specified predictions for each of the four 
causal categories within any given model. Instead 
research has often made predictions for sex differences 
occurring in one or two of the cells depicted in Table 
2, but has ignored the remaining cells, the higher-order 
dimensions of causality and their correlates. 
Nicholls (1975) said more than ten years ago that 
"previous studies of causal judgments after success and 
failure do not all make the joint distinction between 
internal-external and stable-unstable causes" (p. 387), 
but little note was taken. Many years and publications 
later, few papers have presented the three models and 
subjected all three to empirical verification. This 
study will present the three major models, and attempt 
to empirically test their predictions. 
Three Models for Predicting Sex Differences in Causal 
Attributions 
EXTERNALITY MODEL 
This model contends that women tend to make 
external attributions for both success and failure, 
while men tend to make internal attributions for both 
events. Several versions of the Externality model offer 
different explanations, yet make the same predictions, 
and therefore are merged under the Externality label 
{Table 3). 
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Horner's {1969) conceptions of "fear of success" 
and "fear of failure" are used to explain women's 
withdrawl from achievement situations. The "fears" are 
motivational forces that interact with conceptions of 
one's sex role. Particularly feminine identified females 
may be more motivated to avoid success because of the 
possible negative consequences (e.g. male disapproval) 
of doing as well or better than a male on a task {Simon 
& Feather, 1973). Following withdrawl from achievement 
situations, it is hypothesized that women lose touch 
with the internal causes that correlate with their 
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Table 3 
Hypotheses from Three Models concerning Causal 
Attributions for Success and Failure by Sex 
Task Outcome 
Sue~ 
Model Ability Effort Task Luck 
Externality 
females Low Low High High 
males High High Low Low 
Self-Derogatory 
females Low Low High High 
males High High Low Low 
Low Expectancy 
females Low High Low High 
males High Low High Low 
--------------------------------------------------------
Task Outcome ---
Success 
Model Ability Effort Task Luck ----
Externality 
females Low Low High High 
males High High Low Low 
Self-Derogatory 
females High High Low Low 
males Low Low High High 
Low Expectancy 
females High Low High Low 
males Low High Low High 
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subsequent successes and failures. Women rely solely on 
external cues to determine where they may attribute 
causality (Deaux, 1976; Feather, 1969; Simon & Feather, 
1973). In other words, the model suggests women depend 
on an external locus of causality to mediate judgments 
of causality. They attribute any outcome, whether 
success or failure, to the luck and/or task difficulty 
causal categories. 
A second source for hypotheses that fall under the 
Externality Model originate from a sociological 
perspective. Women and other low-status groups, such as 
racial minorities, tend to perceive that they have less 
control over outcomes, and probably do have less control 
in some instances, than higher-status males and other 
high-status groups. The cumulative effect of 
continually perceiving and experiencing lessened control 
gives them the expectation and experience of attributing 
causality for both successes and failures to external 
forces (Merton, 1968; Wiley, Crittenden, & Birg, 1979). 
As a result of making this pattern of causal 
attributions for success and failure, "past performance 
does not provide a basis for generalization to future 
trials since S [the subject] is not the effective agent 
in obtaining reinforcements" (Phares, 1957, p.341). The 
person ascribing causality in an external manner 
perceives him- or herself at the mercy of environmental 
influences. 
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Sweeney, Moreland, and Gruber (1982) have argued 
that the characterization of women as external is not as 
important as the portrayl of men and objectively 
successful women as internally determined. Their 
argument for the "internality bias" among men relates 
this pattern of attributions to the need for internal 
control of outcomes as part of the male sex role. 
Empirical support for the Externality model has 
been mixed. In operationalizing the model many 
researchers neglected to include hypotheses for all four 
causal categories (e.g., Deaux, 1976; Deaux & Farris, 
1977, experiment 1; Feather & Simon, 1973; Phares, 1957; 
Wiley et al., 1979). The latter only make predictions 
for the causal categories of ability and luck: males or 
those with higher general control attribute causality to 
ability (internal-stable) more often than women; women 
or those with low general control attribute causality to 
luck (external-unstable) more often than men. Support 
for the predictions concerning the ability and luck 
causal categories has been fairly consistent and 
confirmatory. 
Despite the lack of consistency in testing the 
Externality model, several studies do provide a starting 
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point for evaluating the model's predictions for all 
four causal categories. Feather (1969), Simon and 
Feather (1973), and Wiley et al. (1979) report that 
females make higher attributions to external factors 
than males regardless of the task outcome, and that 
males utilize the internal attribution categories more 
often than do females. Additional support for the 
Externality model can be found by examining the mean 
attributional ratings by sex in studies that do not test 
all of the hypotheses generated by the models. This 
process yields varying degrees of support for the 
Externality model {Bar-Tal & Darom, 1979; Bar-Tal & 
Frieze, 1977; Deaux & Farris, 1977; McArthur, 1976). 
SELF-DEROGATORY MODEL 
The Self-Derogatory model, as it shall be referred 
to in the present paper, has appeared under multiple 
labels in the Attribution Theory literature. It has 
also been termed Learned Helplessness {Diener & Dweck, 
1978; Dweck & Bush, 1976; Dweck, Davidson, Nelson, & 
Enna, 1978; Dweck & Gotez, 1978; Dweck & Reppucci, 1973; 
Wolleat et al., 1980), Self-Defeating {Heilman & Kram, 
1978), and Attributional Egotism in referrence to male's 
attributional style (Forsyth & Schlenker, 1977; Snyder, 
Stephan, & Rosenfield, & Stephan, 1976). 
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This model assumes women tend to be lower in 
amount of self-esteem than men, and thus attribute 
failure to internal characteristics of themselves in a 
self-derogatory manner. Females attribute success to 
external causes such as an easy task and good luck while 
males display this attributional pattern in response to 
failures. "Causal Attributions of males tend to 
resemble those of high self-esteem subjects, whereas the 
responses of females on the same measures resemble those 
of low eslf-esteem subjects" (Ickes, & Layden, 1978, 
p.124). 
Therefore, the model proposes women take personal 
responsibility for a failure, but they do not take any 
credit for a success (Crandall, Katkowsky, & Crandall, 
1965; Forsyth & Schlenker, 1977; Frieze, Fisher, Hanusa, 
McHugh, & Valle, 1978(a); Ickes & Layden, 1978; Levine, 
Gillman, & Reis, 1982; Nicholls, 1975). Women "see 
themselves as responsible only for negative, not for 
positive, performance outcomes" (Heilman & Kram, 1978, 
p.497). Given the actual equivalence of males and 
females in many achievement-related tendencies (Maccoby, 
& Jacklin, 1974), one would expect females to learn to 
respect their abilities and efforts once they have the 
opportunity to experience success (Heilman & Kram, 
1978). But this is not the case according to the Self-
Derogatory model. 
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For women their attributional style "perpetuates a 
self-fulfilling cycle of negative self-regard" (Heilman 
& Kram, 1978, p. 498) because it dismisses any favorable 
information and embraces personal responsibility for 
negative information. 
Men, who generally report higher levels of self-
esteem for achievement tasks (Snyder, Stephan, & 
Rosenfield, 1976; Frieze et al., 1978a), are 
hypothesized to exhibit the opposite pattern of causal 
attributions (Heilman & Kram, 1978; Ickes & Layden, 
1978) (see Table 3). This pattern has been termed a 
self-serving bias (Arkin & Marvyama, 1979), self-
enhancing (Levine & Gillman, 1982) and egotistical 
(Stephan et al., 1976; Snyder et al., 1978). Egocentric 
attributions, as those made by males, have been 
"interpreted as evidence for a self-serving motivational 
bias which functions to protect self-esteem and/or the 
self-perception process" (Forsyth & Schlenker, 1977, p. 
215-216) by attributing success (an expected outcome) to 
internal factors and failure (unexpected) to external 
factors. The motivation bias is a need to maintain the 
best possible image of oneself (Snyder et al., 1978). 
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Levine et al. (1982) have explicated the process 
by which the self-enhancing bias operates for men: 
It is assumed that such a cognitive bias will allow 
the individual to incorporate favorable information 
and exclude unfavorable information from his or her 
self-concept ... (while) a self-derogatory bias 
would lead to exactly the opposite pattern - greater 
attribution of success to external and failure to 
internal causes. In this manner, positive cognitions 
are excluded from the self-concept, while negative 
information is incorporated. (p. 455-456) 
Results of the proposed attributional styles for 
males and females indicate several potential outcomes. 
First, if females attribute failure internally, the 
result will be decreased motivation following failure 
which interferes with actual task performance (Ickes & 
Layden, 1978). 
Secondly, the consequences of this attributional 
pattern on self-referent affects should be considered 
more closely. Failure experiences tend to reinforce 
feelings of low self-esteem, whereas successful 
experiences will tend to reinforce feelings of high 
self-esteem (Fitch, 1970). High and low self-esteem 
related to task performance might be better termed self-
efficacy (Bandura, 1977) or a person's estimate of how 
well he or she can perform a given task. Levine and 
Uleman (1979) recommend thinking of self-esteem within 
this model in terms of the specific task. Women will 
tend to perpetuate their low self-efficacy for a task by 
attributing success to external factors. They, 
therefore, avoid positive feelings about their 
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accomplishments and do not increase self-efficacy. But 
women do experience negative self-evaluative feelings 
for their failures and decrease self-efficacy after a 
failure (Arkin & Marvyama, 1979; Atkinson, 1964). 
Empirical support for the Self-Derogatory model 
has also been mixed. As is the case with empirical 
evidence for the Externality model, researchers do not 
always evaluate all four causal categories in the 
analysis of their data. However, Stephan et al. (1976) 
found empirical support for both a self-derogatory 
attributional pattern among female subjects and an 
egotistical attributional patern among the males. Snyder 
et al. (1976) also found an egotistical pattern among 
males, but found the pattern for females was dependent 
on the sex of their partner. Females produced the 
expected attributional pattern when paired with a male 
partner, but an egotistial pattern resulted when they 
were paired with another female. 
Contridictory to predictions made by the Self-
Derogatory model, Feather (1969) reports that actual 
measures of self-e~teem did not predict attributional 
rating. 
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LOW EXPECTANCY MODEL 
The third major model to be presented assumes that 
females generally have lower expectancies for success 
than men at achievement-related tasks. The Low 
Expectancy model hypothesizes females will tend to 
predict they will not succeed, and they will 
consistently expect a low level of performance. 
Therefore, when success is experienced, it will be seen 
as an unstable, fluke event. Failure will confirm the 
low expectancy and reinforce failure attributions to 
stable causal categories (Fennema, Reyes, Perl, Konsin, 
& Drakensberg, 1980; Frieze et al., 1978a; McMahan, 
1973; Pedro, Wolleat, Fennema, & Becker, 1981; Valle & 
Frieze, 1976; Weiner, 1976; Wolleat et al., 1980). 
"Failure, being more consistent with females' 
expectations, will receive the stable attributions of 
causality, ability and task difficulty" (Deaux, 1976, p. 
358). 
By discounting success and considering failure as 
indicating stable attributes, females prevent raising 
their expectations for future tasks and actually lower 
these expectations. 
A person who is initially expected to do poorly 
(whether because of race, age, sex, or lack of 
education) will find it difficult to change these 
low expectations. If the individual is successful, 
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this will be attributed to unstable traits and will 
have little influence on later expectations 
(Valle & Frieze, 1976, p. 586) (see Table 3). 
Empirical evidence for the Low Expectancy model 
includes the work of a variety of authors (Bond & 
Deming, 1982; Deaux, 1976; Leder, 1984; McMahan, 1973; 
Parsons et al., 1982; Weigers & Frieze, 1977; Wolleat et 
al., 1980). As with the preceding two models, many of 
the researchers did not make hypotheses concerning all 
four causal categories or report their results in terms 
of the categories and the two dimensions which superpose 
the causes. 
The Low Expectancy model may prove to be 
particularly salient for studying sex differences on a 
stereotypical masculine task, such as math, as it has 
been suggested that women have exaggeratedly low 
expectancies for these tasks (Deaux, 1976). 
Meta-Analysis and Methodological Issues 
To assess which of these models is best supported 
by existing empirical data Frieze, Whitley, Hanusa, and 
McHugh (1982) performed a meta-analysis on 19 studies 
which assessed sex differences in causal ratings for 
success and failure experiences. The sample was limited 
to those studies using adolescent and adult subjects. 
Overall, the meta-analysis found few consistent sex 
differences. When women succeed they are more likely 
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than men to see the task as easy (an external, stable 
attribution). Regardless of outcome (success or failure) 
men view themselves as possessing more ability than 
women, and men are less likely to say luck was 
responsible for an outcome than women. 
Yet, several potentially critical variables and a 
set of hypotheses were not addressed in the meta-
anal ysis. First, the sex-type of the task was not 
considered when performing the meta-analysis, although 
this is a potentially critical variable in the study of 
sex differences in causal attributions research (Frieze 
et al., 1982). Eccles et al. (1984) point out that more 
consistent differences may emerge if investigations 
would focus on sex-typed tasks such as mathematics and 
English because sex differences in causal attributions 
are strongest for sex-typed achievement tasks. Only a 
few studies have looked at sex differences in causal 
attributions for math tasks (e.g., Parsons, Meece, 
Adler, & Kaczala, 1982) despite these precautionary 
statements. 
Secondly, only studies which utilized adult and 
adolescent subjects were included in the meta-analysis, 
despite empirical evidence that attributional patterns 
are established fairly early. Bond and Deming (1982) 
conclude from their research that "different 
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attributional patterns for explaining male and female 
performance appear well established by seven-eight years 
of age and remain strikingly stable through development'' 
(p. 1205). 
Finally, no predictions were made for men's 
attributional patterns although the models do specify 
such patterns (see Table 3). 
More recent studies focusing on sex differences in 
causal attributions for success and failure in 
mathematics have produced mixed results and have failed 
to plan a test of all three models presented here: 
Externality, Self-Derogatory, and Low Expectancy. For 
example, Eccles et al. 's (1984) conclusions support both 
the Self-Derogatory and Low Expectancy models, but makes 
no test of the dissimilar predictions made by the 
models. Leder's (1984) results most closely conform to 
the predictions made by the Low Expectancy model, but 
again, no analyses aimed at testing the complete model 
are made. 
Several minor, but potentially critical, 
components have been lacking in past studies applying 
Attribution Theory to sex differences in mathematics 
ability. Eccles (1984) points out the need for studies 
on school specific areas and achievement tasks presented 
in naturalistic settings to increase external validity 
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of experimental findings. Also, there has been little 
consistency in the type of attributional measuring 
device used. In their meta-analysis of this area, Frieze 
et al. (1982) separated studies using "causal" wording 
from those using "informational" wording. The 
Mathematics Attribution Scale (MAS) (Wolleat, Pedro, 
Becker, & Fennema, 1980), a step in remedying 
inconsistencies which utilizes informational wording, 
has published norms for adolescents and has been used in 
several investigations (Leder, 1982; Pedro, Wolleat, 
Fennema, & Becker, 1981). 
The sex of the experimenter, although this 
variable has been shown to have a significant effect on 
sex differentiated performance on experimental tasks 
(Harris, 1971), particularly when a mathematics task is 
the performance measure (Pedersen, Shinedling, & 
Johnson, 1968), has not been controlled, manipulated, or 
even reported in much of the research in this area. 
Competitiveness and cooperativeness of the task 
performance setting has been found to influence 
attributional patterns for males and females and the 
findings from these studies to date seems to generalize 
to other settings (McHugh, Frieze, & Hanusa, 1982). 
However, settings that require neither competetiveness 
nor cooperativeness between pairmates are needed in the 
area of attribution research for sex differences in 
achievement motivation (Teglasi, 1977). Also, prompting 
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attributional statements by measuring them before the 
experimental task will not be utilized in the present 
study, as it has been hypothesized to differentially 
affect male and female attributional statements when 
measured following task feedback (Fitch, 1970). Finally, 
a limited use of minority subjects has hindered the 
generalizability of past research efforts (Frieze, 
Fisher, Hanusa, McHugh, & Valle, 1978). 
A formal exposition of the three models presented 
and the hypotheses the models generate has been very 
limited in the research literature on sex differences in 
causal attributions for achievement tasks. (Frieze et 
al., 1982). A planned investigation of the 
interpretations of Weiner's Attribution Theory of 
Achievement Motivation to sex differences in mathematics 
(and other sex stereotyped tasks) would be a valuable 
contribution to the research literature in this area. 
The present study attempts to partially fill this 
gap by comparing and contrasting the three models in the 
limited achievement/cognitive area of mathematical 
ability, and by addressing the methodological flaws of 
past studies as is possible within the scope of the 
present project. 
METHOD 
~ubj~cts 
The subjects were 63 undergraduate students 
enrolled in Introductory Psychology at a mid-sized 
Catholic University, located in a major U.S. city. 
Subjects volunteered for the experiment in exchange for 
course credit. Subjects were 34 females and 29 males. 
Their mean age was 18.83 years, with a range of 17 to 22 
years. Fourty-seven subjects were White, 11 were Black, 
three were Asian, and two were Hispanic. There were no 
significant differences between the age or ethnicity of 
male and female subjects. Subjects had a mean of 3.52 
years of high school mathematics and .71 semesters of 
college mathematics. There were no significant sex 
differences on the two measures of mathematics course-
taking behavior, although male subjects consistently 
reported taking more math in high school and in college 
than female subjects. 
Task 
Subjects were informed that the purpose of the 
study is to assess the math and verbal abilities of 
college students. They were asked t6 complete the math 
and spelling sections of the Wide Range Achievement test 
(WRAT) (1979). This assessment tool is used widely in 
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educational and vocational counseling settings to 
classify subjects according to grade level of 
achievement (kindergarten through a grade 20 achievement 
level) in each area assessed. Subjects are given ten 
minutes to complete the math subtest while completion of 
the orally administered spelling test varies. The WRAT, 
as it was administered in the present study, is 
considered a noncompetitive, as well as noncooperative, 
task. Task performance, scoring, and task outcome are 
all individual, and are not dependent on other subjects. 
lndependent Variables 
An approximately equal number of male and female 
subjects were recruited for the experiment. Males and 
females were randomly assigned to the two levels of the 
second independent variable (success and failure) 
described below. 
There was one manipulated independent variable: 
success or failure feedback on the math test. Success 
was arbitrarily defined as ten points above the national 
average of college students taking this test, while 
failure was defined as ten points below the national 
average of college students. All subjects received 
neutral feedback (within the average expected range of 
college students taking this test) for the spelling 
test. 
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The decision to give false test feedback to 
subjects was made to control for the selection threat to 
internal validity (Cook & Campbell, 1979) as when 
essentially different pre-existing groups, such as males 
and females, receive different experimental treatments, 
such as success or failure feedback on a test. Since 
males consistently outperform females on measures of 
mathematical achievement, a pre-existing difference 
between the groups is operating. Without randomized 
subject assignment, relatively more females would 
receive failure feedback and relatively more males would 
receive success feedback. 
A third potential independent variable, sex of the 
experimenter, was controlled by using a male-female co-
experimenter team. Future research in this area needs to 
manipulate this variable to partial out each independent 
variable's effects (Harris, 1971; Pedersen, Shinedling, 
& Johnson, 1968). However, this manipulation was beyond 
the scope of the present study. 
Q_e_pende~!_Y.~!:..!..~12..1 e Mea§_'.:!_re§_ 
The subject's causal attribution statements, the 
dependent variable, was measured by a modified version 
of the Mathematics Attribution Scale (MAS) (Fennema, 
Wolleat, & Pedro, 1982) after receiving false 
performance feedback. 
The MAS, a five-point Likert scale, was designed 
for use with high school students to measure their 
causal attributions to success and failure experiences 
in mathematics. Algebra and geometry were chosen as 
representative high school mathematics courses. Two 
versions of the test were developed, one for each of 
these subjects. The MAS is comprised of eight 
subscales, one for each attributional causal category 
paired with success or failure events. It is a unique 
attribution instrument in several ways. First, by 
treating attributions to success and failure events as 
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independent, the MAS is able to assess the attributional 
categories separately for success and failure. Secondly, 
the MAS renames the "luck" causal category in ATAM. 
It's new name, "environment", was chosen as a more 
appropriate name covering "the wider range of unstable, 
external attributions" (Wolleat et al., 1980, p. 359) 
that have been classified as fitting in this category by 
empirical data (Frieze, 1976; Wolleat et al., 1980) (see 
Table 2) . See Appendix A for the version of the MAS 
used in the present study. 
Scores for the eight attribution subscales are 
obtained by summing each of the four categories of 
attribution statements across Success event stems 
and doing the same for the Failure stems. Subscale 
scores can range from four to 20. There is no 
meaningful overall score. Reliability coefficients 
obtained . . . on the MAS subscales via the Cronbach 
alpha technique were Success-Ability=.77; Success-
Effort=.79; Success-Task=.39; Success-
Environment=.48; Failure-Ability=.63; Failure-
Effort=.66; Failure-Task=.48; and Failure-
Environment=.48 
(Wolleat et al., 1980, p. 359). 
The MAS was modified slightly for use in the 
present study according to Fennema et al. 's (1982) 
instructions for modification. Reference is made to a 
generic math task versus the specified subjects of 
algebra and geometry to accomodate subjects who have a 
varied background in math. Also, wording of the causal 
statements was altered slightly to make the scale 
consistent with assessment of a single testing time 
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versus assessment of performance over a longer period of 
time, such as a semester (see Appendix A). 
The MAS and the modified version used here allows 
subjects to attribute causality for both success and 
failure outcomes to four possible causal sources: 
ability, effort, task and luck. These causal sources lie 
on two dimensions, stability and locus of causality, as 
illustrated in Table 2. No restriction on responses was 
made because Weiner (1985) suggests subjects use a 
varying number of attributional categories to explain an 
event. Although preceding studies have restricted 
responses to conform to the reciprocal nature of within-
person and outside-person causal attributions (Fitch, 
1970) as specified by Reider's (1958) theory. 
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Design 
The design of the experiment conforms to a 2 
(individual feedback: success vs. failure) by 2 (sex of 
the subject: female vs. male) factorial design. The 
total design consists of four experimental conditions 
with approximately 15 subjects per cell (17 females in 
each of the success and failure task outcome conditions, 
15 males in the success outcome condition, and 14 males 
in the failure outcome condition). Random assignment to 
experimental groups was achieved by assigning subjects 
to the success or failure conditions alternately for 
each sex. Specifically, subjects were assigned an 
identification number upon arrival to the experimental 
sessions. Females were given numbers one through 10, 21-
30, and 41-50. Males were given numbers 11-20, 31-40, 
and 51-60. All odd-numbered subjects were assigned to 
the failure condition, and even numbered subjects to the 
success condition. Therefore, the only experimentally 
determined component of the randomization process was 
the placement of the first two subjects of each sex in 
the failure or success conditions, with the first 
subjects for each sex (failure condition) arriving to 
the experimental session before the second subjects 
(success condition). Thereafter, half of the success 
condition subjects arrived before the other half of the 
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success condition subjects for any experimental session. 
The same process was in effect for the failure condition 
subjects. Finally, no limitation (minimum or maximum) 
was put on the number of or sex of the subjects who 
signed up for each experimental session. Therefore, 
after the first experimental session, the alternate 
assignment process to success or failure conditions 
continued where the preceeding session left off. Subject 
assignment for second, third, etc. sessions was 
constrained only by the number of and sex of the 
subjects in previous sessions, and was not 
experimentally manipulated. 
Subjects were tested in groups over the course of 
the college semester. The experimental setting utilized 
was a typical college classroom adjacent to currently 
used classrooms in an effort to increase the external 
validity of any experimental findings by conducting the 
experiment in a naturalistic setting for an achievement 
task (Eccles, 1984). 
Procedure 
-~~~~
Subjects were introduced to the experimental 
procedure with a brief oral description of the 
experiment. Subjects were informed that the purpose of 
the study was to assess the math and English abilities 
of college students in light of the recent concern over 
the decline in these scores over all age groups. They 
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then completed the math and spelling sections of the 
WRAT, which contains 55 and 46 items respectively. 
Subjects were asked to fill out several questionnaires 
which served as filler tasks while one experimenter 
prepared the test feedback. Following completion of the 
questionnaires, the experimenters provided feedback for 
each individual's performance on both portions of the 
WRAT. Feedback was expressed in relation to a national 
average of college students. Subjects then filled out an 
adaptation of the MAS, providing a measure of causal 
attributions. 
Finally, the subjects were completely debriefed, 
both orally and in written form. The nature of the 
deception was explained and they were assured that the 
feedback they received in no way reflected their actual 
performance. Any questions were answered at this time, 
and the author of this paper encouraged subjects to 
contact her if they had any questions, concerns, 
comments or interests in the study. No such contacts 
were made, so it is assumed that no lasting negative 
effects resulted from the experimental manipulation of 
the success and failure feedback. 
RESULTS 
Before the analyses of the dependent measures used 
to test the hypotheses are discussed, several points of 
clarification and preliminary analyses will be 
presented. 
The eight dependent measures, Success-Ability, 
Success-Effort, Success-Task, Success-Environment, 
Failure-Ability, Failure-Effort, Failure-Task, Failure-
Environment, subscales of the MAS, each produce scores 
that may range from four to 20. A score of four 
represents strong disagreement that the particular 
causal category being rated had an influence on the 
corresponding success or failure as described in each 
item's scenario. A score of 20 indicates strong 
agreement that the particular category was an influence 
on the task outcome depicted. A sample MAS is included 
in Appendix A. The actual range of scores is listed in 
Table 4, along with the means and standard deviations 
for these variables by sex of the subject. 
As a check of random assignment to groups for the 
success or failure manipulated task outcome, a one-way 
analysis of variance was conducted on the task outcome 
variable (success or failure determined by random 
assignment to groups} and the actual (undisclosed) WRAT 
math score. There was no effect of group placement by 
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actual math achievement as measured by the WRAT, 
[(1,61)=1.57, ~ >.05, therefore, random assignment to 
groups according to mathematics achievement level is 
supported. 
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Before discussing the findings regarding the 
hypotheses tested, it should be noted that the analyses 
for hypotheses I through IV were performed across the 
sex of the subject (a between-subjects factor), and not 
across the success vs. failure dimension of the MAS 
items (a within-subjects factor) (Winer, 1971). Although 
other researchers have interpreted the models discussed 
earlier in the present paper as not addressing this 
issue (Frieze et al., 1982), the literature was 
understood by this author as clearly distinguishing 
predictions as relatively "high" or "low" across the sex 
of the subject (see Table 3). This oversight by Frieze 
et al. (1982) may be related to an exclusion on their 
part, the aforementioned lack of specific predictions 
for male subjects' attributional patterns. These 
specific predictions have been clearly put forth in much 
of the literature in this area (e.g., Forsyth & 
Schlenker, 1977; Levine et al., 1982; Sweeney, Moreland 
& Gruber, 1982). 
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Sex Differences 
To test the hypothesis that males' and females' 
causal attributions for success and failure task 
outcomes shall differ, a 2 (sex of the subject) by 2 
(success or failure task outcome) multivariate analysis 
of variance was done with sex, and the task outcome to 
be discussed below, treated as between-subjects factors. 
The expected main effect for sex was statistically 
significant, E(8,52)=2.92, ~ <.009. Univariate F-tests 
revealed that females attributed success as due to an 
easy task, an external stable cause, more often than 
males, E(l,59)=5.78, ~ <.019; whereas males described 
themselves as having greater ability, an internal stable 
cause, following a success, E(l,59)=3.88, ~ <.05. Also, 
males attributed failure outcomes as due to a difficult 
task, an external stable cause, signigicantly more often 
than did females, E(l,59)=3.98, ~ <.05 (see Figure 1). 
Thus, as expected, there were significant differences 
between male's and female's attributional styles, the 
pattern of which will be further addressed by hypothesis 
IV. Means and standard deviations for male's and 
female's scores are presented in Table 4, and Figure 1 
presents a graph of the signifcant differences in 
scores. 
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Figure 1: Pattern of Significant Sex Differences on the 
MAS Subscales 
Note. Maximum score = 20, minimum score = 4 . 
.----- Females 
~--- - -Males 
Table 4 
Mean~~tandard Deviations and Ranges of the MAS 
~'!d_bSC§..1~~-for -~al~s and_:[_~males 
Subscale Mean STD 
Success -----
Ability females 11.529* 3.449 
males 13.069 3.555 
Effort females 12.706 3. 167 
males 13.552 3.601 
Task females 13.824*** 2.355 
males 12.379 2.336 
Environ females 12.559 2.956 
males 12.586 2.626 
Failure 
Ability females 11.559 3.544 
males 11.241 3.651 
Effort females 13.265 2.906 
males 12.621 2.665 
Task females 10.294** 3.589 
males 12.103 3.447 
Environ females 8.176 2.249 
males 8.931 2.698 
*2. < .01 
* *2. < .05 
***2. < .02 
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Range 
5-19 
7-20 
7-19 
6-20 
9-18 
8-17 
7-18 
7-19 
5-19 
5-20 
8-18 
8-17 
4-18 
5-17 
4-14 
4-14 
Task Outcome 
The second between subjects factor of the MANOVA 
refered to above addresses the task outcome; regardless 
of sex of the subject, successful task outcomes will 
elicit more internal attributions than external 
attributions and vice-versa for failure task outcomes. 
The expected main effect for task outcome was 
statistically significant, [(8,52)=4.05, E < .001. 
Univariate F-tests revealed that responses to the 
"failure" stems of the MAS did support the hypothesis; 
subjects who failed at the math task attributed their 
failure to their ability and effort, internal causes, 
significantly less than those subjects who succeeded; 
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for ability E(l,59)=21.00, E < .0001, and for effort 
[(1,59)=10.46, E < .002 (Table 5). The responses to the 
"success" stems of the MAS only partially support the 
hypothesis; subjects who succeeded attributed their 
success as significantly less due to luck than those who 
failed, E(l,59)=4.15, E < .046, yet successful subjects 
also attributed their success as less due to their 
ability, an internal factor, than those who failed, 
[(1,59)=12.40, E < .001 (see Figure 2). Means and 
standard deviations for the success and failure 
conditions are presented in Table 6, while descriptive 
statistics for male and female subjects by task outcome 
15 
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Table 5 
Means and Standard Deviations for Subjects by 
Condition Mean STD 
Success -----
Success-Ability 10.875 3.108 
Success-Effort 12.469 3.556 
Success-Task 12.813 2.494 
Success-Environment 11.875 2.960 
Failure-Ability 13.188 3.587 
Failure-Effort 14.031 2.559 
Failure-Task 11.656 3.534 
Failure-Environment 8.531 2.449 
Failure -----
Success-Ability 13.645 3.479 
Success-Effort 13.742 3.098 
Success-Task 13.526 2.365 
Success-Environment 13.290 2.438 
Failure-Ability 9.581 2.487 
Failure-Effort 11.871 2.630 
Failure-Task 10.581 3.668 
Failure-Environment 8.516 2.541 
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Table 6 
Means and Standard Deviations of the MAS Subscales 
for Males and Females by Task Outcome 
Success Failure 
females males females males ----
Success-
Ability 10.529 11.267 12.529 15.000 
(3.145) (3.127) (3.538) (2.987) 
Success-
Effort 12.176 12.800 13.235 14.357 
(3.187) (4.021) (3.153) (3.028) 
Success-
Task 13.765 11. 733 13.882 13.071 
(2.412) (2.187) (2.369) (2.368) 
Success-
Environ 11. 882 11.867 13.235 13.357 
(3.120) (2.875) (2.705) (2.170) 
Failure-
Ability 13.235 13.133 9.882 9.214 
(3.580) (3.720) (2.667) (2.293) 
Failure-
Effort 14.647 13.333 11. 882 11.857 
(2.827) (2.093) (2.315) (3.060) 
Failure-
Task 10.588 12.286 10.000 11.286 
(3.144) (3.661) (4.062) (3.124) 
Failure-
Environ 8.176 8.933 8.176 8.929 
(1.980) (2.915) (2.555) (2.556) 
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assignment are presented in Table 6. 
Interaction Effect 
It was expected that sex of the subject and 
success or failure task outcome variables would interact 
significantly, such that females would score 
significantly different from males on the eight MAS 
subscales depending on whether the subject has 
experienced a success or failure. The hypothesized two-
way interaction (sex by task outcome) was not 
statistically significant, ~(8,52)=.48, ~ <.867, nor 
were any of the resultant univariate tests of 
significance. Discussion of this, and other findings, 
will be addressed in the next section. 
A Test of the Models 
In order to assess which of the models, 
Externality, Self-Derogatory or Low Expectancy, best 
predicts the causal attributions made by males and 
females for success and failure experiences, two sets of 
three Pearson chi-squared goodness-of-fit tests were 
performed (Hayes, 1981). All tests were planned a 
priori. The chi-squared tests were accomplished by 
partitioning each dependent variable, regardless of sex 
of the subject, by its median to establish relative 
"high" and "low" scores as specified by the models. 
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This was done twice, once for the subjects in the 
failure experimental condition and again for those in 
success condition. Then a count of the number of males 
and females whose score fit into either the high or low 
range was made for each causal category. Each subject's 
scores for each category was then coded as a "hit" or a 
"miss" for the appropriate manipulation condition; a hit 
if a male scored in the high group or if a female scored 
in the low group, or a miss if a male scored in the low 
group and a female scored in the high group. The 
results of this procedure are presented in Table 7 under 
the outcome label. 
Six Pearson chi-squared goodness-of-fit tests were 
performed comparing the expected pattern, as predicted 
by each model, to the outcome pattern. None of the 
three models produced a significantly "good-fit" to the 
data: Externality model for success X2(3)=45.50, E >.05, 
for failure X2(3)=84.15, E >.05; Self-Derogatory model 
for success X2(3)=45.5, E >.05, and for failure 
X2{3)=37.14, E >.05, and Low Expectancy for success 
X2{3)=76.30, E >.05, and for failure X2(3)=68.16, E >.05 
(see Table 7). 
The expected outcome pattern for each model was 
derived by first considering the predictions made by 
each model (see Table 3). Since the models make 
Table 7 
Pearson Chi-Squared Goodness-of-Fit Tests Applied to 
the Three Models 
Success Failure ----
Task Outcome Task Outcome 
Model and MAS scores and MAS scores 
Externality 45.50 84.15 
Self-Derogatory 45.50 37.14 
Low Expectancy 76.30 68.16 
Note. None of the chi-squared values reached 
significance at the .05 level. 
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relative predictions rather than point predictions, 
relative numeric values for the expected outcome cells 
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in Table 3 were coded with the lowest number possible in 
any one cell. Hayes (1981) states no cell in a Pearson 
chi-square goodness-of-fit test can by empty, and 
recommends five observations per calls as a minimum to 
perform the test. Therefore, five observations per cell 
were expected in the "low" cells, while the remainder of 
the observations were expected in the "high" prediction 
cells. 
Table 8 is presented to illustrate this process. 
Each of the three models is presented contrasting the 
"predicted" pattern of outcome as predicted by that 
model versus the actual "outcome" produced by the data. 
The expected pattern for each model was generated by 
following the "high" and "low" relative predictions for 
each model as presented in Table 3. Scoring was 
accomplished by recording a "hit" or "1" if males were 
expected to score higher than females, and a "miss" or 
"O" if females were expected to score lower than males. 
A tally of expected hits and misses for each task 
outcome (success and failure) was made while taking into 
account the cell size assumptions of a chi-squared 
goodness-of-fit test. The predicted cells were then 
contrasted with the outcome cells described earlier by 
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Table 8 
Six Pearson Chi-Squared Coodness-of-Fit Tables 
Contrasting the Outcome Predicted by each Model 
versus the Data Outcome for Success and Failure 
Outcome 
Success 
N=33 
Models Ability Effort Task Environment 
Externality 
Predicted 27 27 5 5 
Outcome 18 17 10 18 
Self-Derogatory 
Predicted 27 27 5 5 
Outcome 18 17 10 18 
Low Expectancy 
Predicted 27 5 27 5 
Outcome 18 17 10 18 
Failure 
N=31 
Models Ability Effort Task Environment 
Externality 
Predicted 26 26 5 5 
Outcome 15 13 19 18 
Self-Derogatory 
Predicted 5 5 26 26 
Outcome 15 13 19 18 
Low Expectancy 
Predicted 5 26 5 26 
Outcome 15 13 19 18 
performing six Pearson chi-squared goodness-of-fit 
tests. 
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Although no support was obtained for any of the 
models using the Pearson chi-squared test, an 
examination of the mean scores on the MAS subscales for 
males and females reveals some interesting trends (Table 
9). There are significant differences between males' 
and females' MAS scores on three of the eight subscales. 
The observed difference in the mean attribution scores 
for success to an ability cause is congruent with all 
three models. Men tend to attribute success to ability 
more than do women. Women tend to attribute success to 
an easy task more so than do men. This finding supports 
the Externality and Self-Derogatory models, but not the 
Low Expectancy model. And women tend to attribute 
failure to a difficult task less often than do men, thus 
supporting only the prediction made by the Self-
Derogatory model. 
An examination of the statistically different mean 
MAS scores for males and females reveals a pattern of 
differences in the MAS scores for the subscales Success-
Effort, Failure-Ability, Failure-Effort, and Failure-
Environment which mimics the pattern proposed by the 
Self-Derogatory model. The Success-Environment MAS 
subscale produced mean values which were approximately 
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Table 9 
Means, Directional Trends as Compared to the Opposite 
Sex 1 and Significance Levels of the Mean Differences 
between Males and Females of the MAS Subscales for 
Males and Females 
__ Tasl:S__Q.Y.:t.£9..~-
Success 
Ability Effort Task Luck 
Females 
Mean 11.529 12.706 13.824 12.559 
Directional 
Trend Low Low High Low 
Males 
Mean 13.069 13.552 12.379 12.586 
Directional 
Trend High High Low High 
Significance 
Level of the 
Mean Differences p=.051 p=.325 p=.018 p=.969 
--------------------------------------------------------
(continued) 
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Table 9 (continued) 
Means 1 Directional Trends as Com2ared to the Opposite 
Sex, and Significance Levels of the Mean Differences 
between Males and Females of the MAS Subscales for 
Males and Females 
Task Outcome 
Failure 
Ability Effort Task Luck 
Females 
Mean 11.559 13.265 10.294 8.177 
Directional 
Trend High High Low Low 
Males 
Mean 11.241 12.621 12.103 8.931 
Directional 
Trend Low Low High High 
Significance 
Level of the 
Mean Differences p=.728 p=.366 p=.047 p=.231 
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equal in value and in the opposite direction to that 
predicted by the Self-Derogatory model. The Success-
Environment MAS subscale produced mean values which were 
approximately equal in value and in the opposite 
direction to that predicted by the Self-Derogatory model 
(see Tables 3, 8 and 9). 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The findings of the present study support some of 
the past research in the area of applying ATAM to sex 
differences and shall be reviewed briefly. First, males 
and females attribute causality for success and failure 
task outcomes to causal categories in a significantly 
different manner. These patterns of attributions can 
best be predicted by the Self-Derogatory model. The 
Self-Derogatory model claims that females attribute 
causality for success to external causes and for failure 
to internal causes, while males attribute in a self-
enhancing manner by attributing success to internal 
causes and failure to external causes. Also, the 
present study confirmed predicted attributional 
differences used by persons who experience success 
versus failure. Subjects who succeeded at the math task 
attributed their success to internal factors more than 
external ones, while those who failed attributed their 
failure to external factors more than to internal ones. 
The purpose of this study was to apply ATAM in an 
investigation of a specific cognitive ability, 
mathematics, in which fairly consistent sex differences 
are found (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974). The sex-
stereotyped nature of mathematics prohibits 
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generalization of the findings to other tasks as males' 
and female's causal attributions differ depending on the 
nature of the task (McHugh et al., 1982, cited in Frieze 
et al., 1982; Wolleat et al., 1980). 
The findings of the present study also may be only 
applicable to college aged students. Continued research 
in this area contrasting the Externality, Self-
Derogatory and Low Expectancy models using various 
subject groups of differing ages, education and other 
backround variables would address the generalizability 
of the present findings. Yet, the findings can and 
should be discussed in terms of mathematics achievement 
which has impact on career choice and attainment (Frieze 
et al., 1978a; Parsons et al., 1982). 
Discussion of the Major Findings 
The existence of sex differences in the use of 
causal attributional categories for success and failure 
experiences is supported by the present study. An 
overall main effect for the sex of the subject was 
highly significant. Females' and males' use of causal 
attributional categories were significantly different 
from one another. Significant univariate effects were 
achieved for only three of the eight MAS subscales by 
sex, and none of the three models produced a 
significantly good-fit to the data as measured by 
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Pearson chi-squared goodness-of-fit tests, yet the three 
significant univariate F-tests do differentiate the 
models to some extent. All three models predict the 
significant difference found on the Success-Ability MAS 
subscale; men tend to attribute success to their own 
ability, an internal stable cause, more than do women. 
The next significant MAS subscale difference to be 
discussed supports the Externality and Self-Derogatory 
models, but not the Low Expectancy model (see Table 3). 
Women tend to attribute success to an easy task while 
men minimize this cause in their explanation of a 
success experience. Thirdly, women tend to attribute 
failure to a difficult task less often than do men, a 
finding which is predicted by the Self-Derogatory model 
alone. Thus, only one model, the Self-Derogatory model, 
accurately predicted the significant sex differences in 
causal attributions for success and failure at a math 
task. 
Further information may be gleaned by examining 
the statistically nonsignificant differences in males' 
and females' MAS subscale scores. The directional 
trends in males' and females' mean MAS scores (see Table 
8) highlights additional information. ATAM theorists 
and researchers have emphasized that subjects use a 
variety of causal categories for any one event, so 
predominance of category use is of primary importance 
(Feather, 1969; Weiner, 1985). Therefore, examining 
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trends in the use of causal categories seems to be a 
salient modus operandi from a theoretical point of view. 
Trends in the sex differences in mean scores for 
the Success-Effort, Failure-Ability, Failure-Effort, and 
Failure-Luck accurately reproduce the relative "high" 
and "low" score predictions made by the Self-Derogatory 
model. Only the Success-Luck subscale mean difference 
between males and females contradicts the Self-
Derogatory model. The Externality and Low Expectancy 
models, on the other hand, are contradicted by trends in 
five of the eight subscale scores. In light of the 
preceding discussion, it appears that the Self-
Derogatory model has the most, although not 
overwhelming, support and generates the most predictive 
power when applied to sex differences in attributions 
for achievement in mathematics. The Self-Derogatory 
model anticipates females will not take credit for a 
success by making internal attributions for that event, 
but instead attribute success to external factors such 
as an easy task, luck, or some other favorable 
evnvironmental factor. Yet, females blame their lack of 
ability and low amount of effort as causing failure 
experiences, while ignoring external factors that may 
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have contributed to their poor performance. Thus, 
females tend to perpetuate low levels of self-esteem for 
success at a math task. 
According to the Self-Derogatory model, men 
attribute causality for success and failure in a self-
enhancing or egotistical way. Males maintain a high 
degree of self-esteem in task specific areas or self-
eff icacy (Bandura, 1977), by attributing success to 
internal factors and failure to external factors. 
Therefore, men incorporate favorable information and 
ascribe it to themselves and disregard negative 
information as inapplicable to oneself. 
Implications of a self-derogatory attributional 
style for females and a self-enhancing bias for males 
are several. First, empirical evidence shows internal 
attributions for failure result in decreased motivation 
and decrements in actual task performance (Ickes & 
Layden, 1978). Women may experience failure at 
mathematics with increasing frequency as their 
attributions for one such failure experience affects 
motivation and actual performance, thus adding to the 
self-perpetuating cycle of negative self-regard 
discussed as a result of the attributional pattern 
itself (Heilman & Kram, 1978). 
Secondly, women's affective experience, including 
their self-esteem for the task specific behaviors, are 
generally negative. According to Weiner (1985) an 
attribution for success to external factors results in 
surprise and gratitude, whereas success attributed to 
internal causes results in feelings of competence. 
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Also, attributions for failure to external causes result 
in anger or aggression, whereas attributions for failure 
to internal causes result in shame, guilt and 
incompetence. Therefore, women will tend to experience 
negative affective experiences for failure and few self-
referent and/or positive affects for success. Men, on 
the other hand, will experience positive feelings such 
as competence after a success and direct any negative 
feelings following failure towards external sources. 
The hypothesis that the manipulated task outcome, 
regardless of sex of the subject, would have a 
significant effect on attributional statements lying 
along the internality-externality dimension was 
supported. It was predicted that subjects who succeed 
tend to take personal responsibility for the outcome by 
attributing their success to internal causes such as 
ability and effort. Subjects who fail tend to shun 
personal responsibility for the outcome by attributing 
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their failures to external causes such as bad luck and a 
difficult task. 
Three of the eight MAS subscale mean scores by sex 
resulted in significant differences as predicted by 
hypothesis II. Subjects who failed at the math task 
attributed the outcome significantly less often to 
ability and effort, both internal causes, than those 
subjects who succeeded. Also, subjects who succeeded 
considered luck, an external cause, a less important 
cause of the outcome than those who failed. 
Yet, contradictory to the predictions made in 
hypothesis II, successful subjects also attributed 
causality to an ability factor, an internal cause, less 
than those who failed. While this finding may be 
initially somewhat surprising, it may be that female's 
attributions to ability for a success event are 
infrequent, as predicted by all three models addressed 
by hypothesis IV, and confirmed by empirical evidence 
(Frieze et al., 1982). Therefore, the females' 
attributions for the Success-Ability score are low 
enough to deflate the effect of higher scores from the 
male subjects. The hypothesis remains unconfirmed for 
this causal category, yet the effect of strong sex 
differences on the Success-Ability score may be a 
contributing factor which overrides attributional 
73 
differences predicted by the task outcome. 
The lack of support for an interaction between the 
sex of the subject and the manipulated task outcome is 
puzzling and difficult to explain. Perhaps this 
indicates sex of the subject and the task outcome must 
be considered jointly in future research and in 
evaluating past research in this area. Each main effect 
examined in the study significantly affects causal 
attributions for success or failure at a math task. 
However, the differences are embedded in variations 
along each effect such that sex differences must be 
discussed separately for success or failure at math 
tasks. 
In sum, ATAM and the Self-Derogatory model 
interpretation of the theroy appears to be one area of 
investigation which may aid in explaining the observed 
differences in male's and female's mathematical ability 
as a learned difference. ATAM and the Self-Derogatory 
model gained some empirical support from the present 
study which is one of few studies in the area of sex 
differences in attributions of causality for success and 
failure which focused on a meaningful as well as sex-
typed task. 
Further Issues for Consideration 
In addition to considering the factors discussed 
above in interpreting the present study's results, 
several additional factors need to be considered. Past 
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research has found that ability and effort are the most 
salient attributional categories among the six that the 
revised ATAM has proposed (Frieze, 1976; Weiner, 1979). 
Therefore, it may be problematic in verifying a model 
using all four causal categories. The causal categories 
task and luck will likely be used less often and may not 
be directly comparable to attributions to ability and 
effort. Attributions for failure to task and 
luck/environment appear to be somewhat less frequently 
endorsed (see Table 4). The effect of this discrepancy 
on experimental findings should be evaluated in future 
research. 
Secondly, linked to the aforementioned factor, the 
Failure-Task, Success-Task, Failure-Environment, and 
Success-Environment subscales of the MAS have relatively 
low reliability coefficients (Fennema et al., 1979). 
These subscales may not be accurately tapping the 
intended causal category and produce nonsignif icant 
results where there actually are differences. Future 
research in this area may advance more quickly with the 
development and use of consistent and reliable measures 
of attributional causality. 
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The lack of support for any of the three models in 
a recent meta-analysis (Frieze et al., 1982) may be 
dependent on several factors. Although meta-analysis 
has proven to be a useful technique for summarizing an 
area of research (Glass, 1977), the scope of its 
applicability from which conclusions can be drawn is 
determined by the scope of the studies it uses to obtain 
effect sizes and the basis for inclusion or exclusion of 
a study from the meta-analysis. Two such issues must be 
raised in regard to Frieze et al. 's (1982) findings and 
the present study. First, Frieze et al. (1982) included 
studies from the attributional research literature which 
utilized a wide variety of achievement tasks in a wide 
variety of areas. Some of these tasks appear very 
trivial (color matching, Phares, 1957), while others are 
much more salient to the subject (an examination grade, 
Simon & Feather, 1973; Sweeny et al., 1982). 
The disparity among the tasks for which 
achievement motivation has been assessed limits the 
generalizability of any one of the studies to other task 
areas. Likewise, the applicability of Frieze et al. 's 
(1982) meta-analysis is potentially severely confounded. 
Perhaps their application of meta-analysis to this area 
of research was premature; more research needs to be 
done focusing on specific task-types, as well as making 
more comphrensive predictions across all causal 
dimensions for studies in this area. 
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Secondly, Frieze et al. (1982) chose to exclude 
studies in this area which used children as subjects, 
although empirical evidence has demonstrated that 
"different attributional patterns for explaining male 
and female performance appear well established by seven-
eight years of age and remain strikingly stable through 
development" (Bond & Deming, 1982, p. 1205). By 
including the many studies in this area that use 
children as subjects, Frieze et al. (1982) may have 
reached a very different conclusion. 
Thus, ATAM and the Self-Derogatory model appear to 
possess some explanatory power for sex differences in 
mathematics achievement. However, it appears to be 
necessary to conduct future research in sex differences 
in mathematics achievement and other areas of 
achievement by studying multiple psychological factors 
that correlate with gender (Levine et al., 1982) on 
distal as well as proximal levels (Bandura, 1977), to 
arrive at a more complete understanding of the sources 
and the environmental-societal causes of sex differences 
in mathematics achievement. 
It is recommended that future research efforts 
continue to investigate sex differences in mathematics 
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achievement by applying ATAM and the Self-Derogatory 
model in conjunction with efforts to tap other causal 
sources of the sex difference. Some of these include 
situational variables such as sex of a pairmate at a 
task (Heilman & Kram, 1978; Synder et al., 1978); 
cooperative versus competetive tasks (McHugh et al., 
1982); other sex-typed tasks (Wolleat et al., 1980); and 
individual variables such as subjective perceptions of 
success and failure (Sweeney et al., 1982), sex-role 
identity (Williams, 1983), math anxiety (Plake & 
Parker, 1982), value of success at a task (Atkinson, 
1964) and many others. 
Finally, it is suggested that future research in 
this area discontinue viewing women and men (or any 
other group) as homogenous because many variables 
determine any one person's actions in any given 
situation (Bandura, 1977). Only when more complex 
research projects are undertaken utilizing sophisticated 
methodological and statistical techniques soundly, and 
considering multiple causal sources, will solutions to 
puzzles such as the one addressed in this study be 
solved. 
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APPENDIX A 
MATHEMATICS ATTRIBUTION SCALE 
Imagine that the events described below occured. You 
must rate each of the four causes listed under each 
event in terms of its likelihood. 
Event A: A section of your math test was wrong. 
Causes 
~--~ 
1. You just couldn't remember how do to the 
steps. 
2. You were careless about completing it. 
3. The part marked wrong included a step 
which was more difficult. 
4. You were unlucky. 
90 
Be sure to rate all four possible causes of each event 
according to how you feel it applies to you. Do you 
STRONGLY AGREE, AGREE, are you UNDECIDED, do you 
DISAGREE, or STRONGLY DISAGREE with number 1 of Event A? 
Mark your answer in the appropriate column on your 
answer sheet. Then do the same with cause number 2, 3 
and 4 for Event A. Now move on to Event B and do the 
same. Even though some of the events may seem 
repetative, be sure to answer each cause for each event. 
Event B: You got the grade you wanted on the math 
test. 
5. The content of the test was easy. 
6. In the past you spent a lot of time 
studying math. 
7. Your past math teachers have been good at 
explaining math. 
8. You have a special talent for math. 
Event C: You had trouble with some of the problems. 
9. The testing room was too loud and dis-
tracted you. 
10.You don't think in the logical way that 
math requires. 
11.You didn't take the time to answer the 
questions carefully. 
12.They were difficult problems. 
Event D: You did not perform as well as the rest 
of the group on the math test. 
13. Students sitting around you didn't pay 
attention and distracted you. 
14. You didn't spend much time working on 
the test. 
15. The material is difficult. 
16. You have always had a difficult time in 
math. 
Event E: You were able to complete a math test 
easily. 
17. The problems were interesting. 
18. The effort you put into the test helped. 
19. You are a very able math student. 
20. You lucked into taking an easy version of 
the test. 
Event F: You were able to understand a difficult 
unit on a math test. 
21. Your past math teachers presented the 
material well. 
22. Your ability is more obvious when you 
are challenged. 
23. You put extra hours of study time into 
learning those types of problems. 
24. The problems were easy. 
Event G: You received a low grade on a math test. 
25. You are not the best student in math. . 
26. You have studied those types of problems, 
but not hard enough. 
27. There were questions you have never seen 
before. 
28. Past math teachers of yours spent too 
little time on this type of problem. 
Event H: You have passed most math tests with no 
trouble. 
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29. Past teachers made learning math interest-
ing. 
30. You are talented in math. 
31. You spent hours of extra time studying 
math. 
32. The test covered simple problems. 
Event I: There are times when you just can't solve 
certain types of math problems. 
33. It is a task which doesn't interest you. 
34. Even though you try, you don't understand 
it well. 
35. Other class members disturbed your con-
centration. 
36. You don't spend enough time studying them. 
MAS Answer Sheet 92 
Strongly ~a~eo Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly 
- - .. - Disaa.::-eo 
Event A: Cause 1. I I 
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II 
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II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
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Event G: 11 25. 
" 26. 
II 27. 
II 28. 
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MAS Answer Sheet- pg. 2 
Event H: Cause 
. Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly 
Aoree Disagree 
" 
29.
1 
- I 
3~., 
3_. -· ------~-_;._ _ ___,! 
32. I I 
" 
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~- I I r------------------------_;._-----,. 
3~._1 __________________________________________ ~ 
II 
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MAS SCORING MANUAL 
Instructions: Fill out the following charts for each 
subject, total across rows, then total each subscale 
(i.e., Success-Ability, Failure-Task) to get eight 
subscale scores for each subject. 
raw subscale 
1 2 3 4 5 total score 
Success-Ability 
statement 8. 
statement 19. 
statement 22. 
statement 30. 
Success-Effort 
statement 6. 
statement 18. 
statement 23. 
statement 31. 
Success-Task 
statement 5. 
statement 17. 
statement 24. 
statement 32. 
Success-Environment 
statement 7. 
statement 20. 
statement 21. 
statement 29. 
F ailure-Ability 
statement 10. 
statement 16. 
statement 25. 
statement 34. 
F ailure-Effort 
statement 11. 
statement 14. 
statement 26. 
statement 36. 
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raw subs ca le 
1 2 3 4 5 total score 
Failure-Task 
statement 12. 
statement 15. 
statement 27. 
statement 33. 
Failure-Environment 
statement 9. 
statement 13. 
statement 28. 
statement 35. 
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